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How might the EU respond to the unprecedented event of a Brexit? Tim Oliver argues that its response
will be defined by 5 I’s: ideas, interests, institutions, the international, and individuals. Looking at these 5 I’s also
sheds light on various theoretical approaches to understanding Brexit.
How would the rest of the EU respond to a British vote to leave? Would the EU’s approach to a withdrawal be
defined by institutional links, opinions of key leaders, economic and security interests, international pressures, or
ideas about integration or disintegration? Will it be a mix of these, in which case, which will be the most influential?
What should the British government and public look to in order to understand what to expect from the EU? How
should academics theorise a Brexit?
We can understand how the EU might respond to a British withdrawal by looking at five I’s: ideas, interests,
institutions, the international, and individuals. No one ‘I’ will dominate, and identifying which will dominate more than
others will be a key challenge in understanding and applying theoretical approaches to a Brexit .
Ideas
A vote to depart completely from the idea of an ‘ever closer union’ would challenge the very idea in an
unprecedented way. Will the idea of European disintegration then take hold across the EU as some domino effect
sees other governments and their citizens give up on the EU? Or will other EU member states respond in much the
same way as they have to many other crises by trying to integrate further? If so, then any new deal with the UK
would prioritise EU unity, blocking any UK-EU deal that allows Britain a privileged alternative relationship that could
weaken the Union.
Individual member states will assert their own ideas of what Brexit means for them. For example, the Irish
Government has made clear it will not be caught in the slipstream of British decisions. Independence and links to the
EU are viewed as equal to or of greater importance than relations with Britain. For states ranging from Greece and
the Baltic states through to France and Germany, the UK and the Brexit debate are already something of a
distraction from various ideas of how European integration can better ensure the security and stability of Europe.
Interests
With Britain as one of the world’s largest economies, some Eurosceptics argue the EU needs the UK more than the
UK needs the EU. Britain does run a trade deficit with the EU (£61.6 billion in 2014), meaning the rest of the EU has
an economic incentive to find a solution. However, from the perspective of the rest of the EU it is the UK that is
vulnerable. Britain represents somewhere around 16% of total EU trade (admittedly excluding services) while the EU
represents 44.6% of the UK’s exports of good and services in 2014.
Nevertheless, economic, social and security interests can play a powerful role. To take one example, fear amongst
German car manufacturers at a bad UK-EU exit deal could force the German government to push for a relationship
that avoids any disruption to trading links. The potential costs for Ireland (including violence in Northern Ireland)
could force it to reconsider its ideas of resisting British decisions. The large EU population in the UK and UK
population elsewhere in the EU mean a mutually beneficial deal will need to be hammered out.
The argument works against Britain as some states will seek to gain economically by seeking to attract investment
that would have gone to Britain.  Some countries might also use a Brexit to push a more social and protectionist EU,
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limiting any UK efforts to use a Brexit as a means to undercut the EU economically.
If the potential economic interests are not strong enough, then the same cannot be said for Britain in European
foreign and defence cooperation. Common areas of concern such as Iran, Russia or migration mean the UK and EU
could continue to need one another. At the same time, the UK has been one of the blocks to cooperation in this area,
with its exit potentially paving the way for further such efforts.
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Institutions
Several processes and institutions will shape a Brexit. Article 50, the EU treaty’s withdrawal clause, provides a
degree of structure for both sides, albeit one that is untested and which contains a range of flaws. The legal and
administrative issues alone make Article 50 a Pandora’s Box that both sides will face with a sense of trepidation.
Agreeing a new UK-EU relationship will require the consent of every member state, the European Parliament, and
potentially may draw in the European Court of Justice. None of these can be relied on to grant a quick agreement
that meets UK demands.
The UK and EU would also be constrained by existing wider European and international structures. If no new
relationship was reached then the EU would still have to work within the limits of World Trade Organisation rules,
although Britain is highly unlikely to benefit  much from a WTO defined relationship. The European Free Trade Area
and the European Economic Area have existing agreements that Britain would have to fit into with the agreement of
members such as Norway or Switzerland.
International
International pressures on the UK and the EU could define how they manage an exit. The negotiation of a
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) reflects a desire by the USA and the EU to use their
interdependent economic relationship to shape global economics and politics. While the UK could be locked out of
the main processes by which TTIP will be setup and launched, its long-term exclusion would run counter to the aims
of TTIP to extend beyond the EU and USA. The agreement will also frame how the UK attempts its own trade deals
with countries such as China or Brazil.
International events may also drive UK-EU cooperation. Terrorist attacks, aggressive behaviour by Russia (perhaps
creating an ‘other’ against which common UK and EU resolve is formed), common concerns about environmental or
migration crises could mean international events push the UK and EU into a harmonious new relationship. British
ideas about restructuring the EU and freedom of movement have gained some traction thanks to developments
connected to Syria. That said, international events could cause divisions and animosity between the UK and parts of
the EU, such as happened over the Iraq War.
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=Individuals
If there is one place where animosity could be a particular problem it is in the relations between leaders. David
Cameron is likely to resign should he lose a referendum where he backed the UK staying in. A victorious Eurosceptic
wing of the Conservative party would then deliver a Conservative British Prime Minister unlikely to be in a position to
compromise in negotiations over a new UK-EU deal.
EU leaders could also be in a mood to concede much, particularly if the British people had rejected a renegotiated
relationship the rest of the EU made the effort to craft at a time when they would rather have been focusing on issues
such as the Eurozone, Russia or migration. Angela Merkel, in particular, could find herself in a difficult position. With
German elections scheduled in 2017 she may be in no position – or personally inclined – to offer much. Without
German support, Britain will face a much bigger struggle in securing the agreement of every other EU state and its
leadership.
Theorising Brexit
The study of the EU is filled with theories of European integration. Brexit confronts us with the need to theorise
European disintegration. Theories are tools that allow us to focus on certain aspects of developments in the world
around us, highlighting – and testing – their importance over others. These 5 I’s above touch on some of the various
theoretical approaches we can use to try and understand where a Brexit could take the EU and UK. In a simplified
way, constructivism points to the role of ideas as paramount in shaping how a Brexit is handled. In realism it is the
interests and international pressures that will be decisive. Institutionalist or neofunctionalist theories throw light on
the powerful limits existing institutions and networks will play (or might not play if Brexit exposed any weaknesses in
them). Liberal intergovernmentalism draws in a mix of interests, institutions and ideas to highlight that Britain and the
EU (especially Germany, France and other big states) are caught up in a deeply enmeshed set of interdependencies
from which there is no easy escape whatever their leaders may want.
The article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the LSE BrexitVote blog, nor of the London School of
Economics and Political Science. 
Tim Oliver is a Dahrendorf Postdoctoral Fellow on Europe-North American relations at LSE
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